

City of London Corporation Committee Report

Committee(s): Corporate Services Committee – For Information Policy & Resources Committee – For Information	Dated: 7 th May 2025 8 th May 2025
Subject: Grenfell report, Phase 2 overview	Public report: For Information
This proposal: • delivers Corporate Plan 2024-29 outcomes • provides statutory duties • provides business enabling functions	Diverse Engaged Communities Leading Sustainable Environment Vibrant Thriving Destination Providing Excellent Services Flourishing Public Spaces
Does this proposal require extra revenue and/or capital spending?	No
If so, how much?	N/A
What is the source of Funding?	N/A
Has this Funding Source been agreed with the Chamberlain's Department?	N/A
Report of:	Greg Moore, Deputy Town Clerk
Report author:	Oli Sanandres, Director of Health & Safety Richard Woolford, Strategic Security Director & Counter Terrorism Advisor

Summary

This paper provides an overview of the City of London Corporation's response to the findings of Volume 7 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report, which focuses on the Local Authority management of building safety controls and responses to associated risks. It is not yet possible to quantify fully what additional resources (financial or otherwise) may be required in respect of addressing the recommendations of this report, however work is currently being undertaken that will allow the affected departments to complete an assessment and provide a precise estimation of the necessary resources, these will be allocated towards enhancing capability of people, upgrading key systems and maintaining the building infrastructure.

The Corporate Safety and Resilience Teams within the Town Clerk's Department have conducted a detailed assessment of the report's recommendations with direct relevance to Local Government and to the City of London Corporation. Each recommendation has been evaluated not only from a City of London perspective but also through a Pan-London Regional lens, ensuring alignment with collective efforts across London. To support this regional approach, the recommendations have been assigned to specific Resilience Boards or Professional Networks to consult, deliberate, and propose actionable steps.

The Grenfell Tower disaster shows that the principle of subsidiarity, which lies at the heart of the arrangements for responding to civil emergencies, is both its strength and its weakness. In general, the local authority, in conjunction with the emergency services, is usually best placed as a result of existing structures, familiarity with local conditions, and knowledge of the communities affected, to respond effectively to an emergency, particularly one that is confined to a relatively small area. Even in cases where a larger area is involved, such as widespread flooding, the local authority is likely to be best placed to organise both the immediate response and the subsequent recovery. However, its effectiveness depends on four things:

- I. The existence of an emergency plan that has been well thought out, is well understood by those who have to implement it and has been practised with sufficient frequency and rigour to ensure that it can be put into operation without undue delay.
- II. Sufficient human and financial resources to enable the plan to be implemented.
- III. A chief executive with the necessary skills and strength of character to take control of the situation with the support of senior officers who are capable of taking responsibility for different aspects of the plan's implementation.
- IV. An understanding within the organisation of the importance of resilience and a commitment to achieving it.

Additionally, the Corporate Health and Safety Team has reviewed the report and identified areas where inadequate management practices or implementation gaps with existing fire safety legislation and guidance contributing to increased risks. Based on this review, the team has outlined recommendations to strengthen the Corporation's approach to managing risks in both residential and non-residential properties.

The paper outlines these initial assessments and proposed actions to ensure more effective safety management, compliance, and alignment with regional efforts.

As the outcomes of the Grenfell report span both resilience and corporate health and safety, this report is presented for information to the Policy & Resources Committee (which holds responsibility for the former area) and the Corporate Services Committee (which holds responsibility for the latter).

Recommendation(s)

Members are asked to: Note the report.

Main Report

Background

1. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry was established following the devastating fire at Grenfell Tower in June 2017, which claimed 72 lives. The inquiry was divided into two phases:
 - Phase 1 focused on the events of the night of the fire, examining how the fire started, its rapid spread, the emergency response, and the impact on residents. The Phase 1 report, published in October 2019, identified key failings, particularly around the building's cladding system and the fire safety measures in place.
 - Phase 2 investigated the broader context, including the decisions, policies, and actions of those responsible for the design, construction, and refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, as well as the adequacy of the building safety regulations and their enforcement. It also examined the role of central and local government in managing fire safety and responding to events.
2. The publication of the Phase 2 report represents the culmination of years of in-depth investigation, testimony from hundreds of witnesses, and the analysis of extensive evidence. It highlights systemic failings in building safety and governance, providing recommendations to improve fire safety management and prevent similar tragedies in the future.

Current Position

3. We have broken down our review of the findings into two parts: Fire Safety Management and Response Management reviews. These are outlined in the tables below. The Department of Community and Children's Service (DCCS) exhibits a notable risk profile in this area and has been involved closely with the preparation of this report. The recommendations highlight specific areas for improvement.

4. Fire Safety Management

Recommendation Reference 31.54
Key Theme - Reporting to the Board
Area - Governance
City of London Corporation Owner – All Departments & Institutions
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i>
<i>31.54 'although there was a satisfactory system in place for reporting through senior management to the board and the scrutiny committee, it failed to operate</i>

effectively because of an entrenched reluctance on the part of individuals to inform the board and RBKC's scrutiny committees of matters that affected fire safety.'

Analysis:

It is critical to safety that there is an open culture to enable appropriate escalation of fire safety issues to ensure the Corporations ability to exercise effective oversight of performance under the Fire Safety Order and other fire legislation.

Local issues or gaps – The new Health & Safety Management Framework and Risk Management Framework supports to develop this culture. However, it is incumbent on all Chief Officers to understand the risks to their operations posed by fire and ensure this cultural change is driven through their ownership of this key risk area. Those in governance roles should ask good questions to understand if these processes are effectively working.

Recommendation Reference 32.17

Key Theme – Absence of fire safety as a key performance indicator

Area – Monitoring

City of London Corporation Owner – All Departments & Institutions

Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report

32.17 Although the key performance indicators evolved over the years, none related to fire safety or fire safety management, fire risk assessments, or performance by the TMO of its duties under the Fire Safety Order.

Analysis:

Corporate KPI's for fire safety should be defined, monitored and reported by every department to the Strategic Health & Safety Board and in departmental health and safety meetings.

Local issues or gaps – No KPI's have been set. Corporate H&S to define and shape these. A review is currently in progress to identify broader H&S KPIs, of which fire will be a part of. An obstacle for this is the lack of any Corporate wide, consistently used system to be able to record and manage KPI tracking & reporting. In Department of Community & Children's Services (DCCS) the system is not sufficiently robust and are currently relying on a manual system. This is being reviewed.

Recommendation Reference 35.12
Key Theme - The competent person
Area - Resources
City of London Corporation Owner - All Departments & Institutions
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i> <i>35.12 Article 18(1) of the Fire Safety Order requires the responsible person to appoint one or more competent persons to assist him in undertaking the preventive and protective measures. In particular, article 18(3) obliges the responsible person to ensure that the number of competent persons appointed, the time available for them to fulfil their functions and the means at their disposal are adequate having regard to the size of the premises, the risks to which relevant persons are exposed and the distribution of those risks throughout the premises.</i> Analysis: Chief Officers must ensure they have sufficient suitably trained competent persons, to effectively manage their fire safety risks. As fire risk assessments are the responsibility of the occupying department, this will impact on all areas of the Corporation.
Local issues or gaps – Some higher complexity departments lack individuals with fire safety competence. At a corporate level, there is a strong dependence on the Fire Safety Advisor within the central team, currently the only competent person available. In DCCS there are plans to recruit a permanent health and safety team which will include a designated fire safety resource and a building safety manager.

Recommendation Reference 39.31/61/66/67
Key Theme - Response to fire risk assessments
Area - Monitoring and governance
City of London Corporation Owner - All Departments & Institutions
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i> <i>39.31 The effect of that amendment was that whereas previously the TMO had been required to complete the work within the prescribed periods, it was now required only to have started it within that period. No date for completion was prescribed.</i> <i>39.33 The main problem created by the change was that it meant that in theory a responsible person could allow remedial measures to remain incomplete indefinitely, provided they had been started within the required time.</i> Analysis: Recommendations from fire risk assessments must be monitored and reported based on their completion only, and not if the work has started or is planned. <i>39.61 The TMO's fire safety strategy made specific provision for instances where it was not possible to complete remedial work within the required time. Paragraph 14.4.2 provided that if high-priority work could not be completed within the time indicated, interim measures would be implemented to reduce the risk in the short term. That was a sound attempt, in theory at least, to render the risk as low as</i>

reasonably practicable, but the TMO failed to create suitable plans to ensure that necessary interim measures were identified, documented or completed.

Analysis: Recommendations from fire risk assessments should be completed within the recommended timescales, and where not possible, records maintained to confirm that mitigation has been implemented until the works are completed.

39.66 It appears that the TMO executive team never reported to the board on the need for remedial work or the extent of the delay in carrying it out. That is consistent with its failure to report to the board other matters of importance to fire safety. As a result, the board lacked the information it needed to perform its function. It did not know whether the TMO was complying with its statutory duties and did not have the information it needed to make decisions that might enable its management to eradicate the arrears of remedial work.

39.67 The TMO's executive team itself does not appear to have been regularly and reliably provided with information about the arrears of remedial work, which, as was plain from the content of the minutes, was a chronic problem. If it had been given that information and had reported properly to the board, the board might have realised that the TMO had long-term difficulty completing remedial work.

Analysis: Department health and safety leads must report on completion of fire risk assessment recommendations as a corporate KPI. Departments must also effectively escalate where issues prevent completion.

Local issues or gaps – No corporate wide, consistently used system is available to be able to record and manage KPI tracking & reporting. No corporate wide system to manage tracking of fire RA's and action completion is in place. In DCCS there is a need to report on completion as well as actions where there are no steps in place to deal with them.

Recommendation Reference 39.68
Key Theme - Auditing the fire risk assessment programme
Area - Monitoring
City of London Corporation Owner - All Departments & Institutions
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i> <i>39.68 Although Janice Wray and the other members of the Health and Safety Committee gave frequent consideration to the question of remedial work, they never attempted to identify trends and failings in the delivery and implementation of the fire risk assessment programme. Such an audit was advised by clause 7.4 of PAS 7:2013. The failure to undertake such an exercise contributed to the TMO's lack of understanding of the underlying causes of the problem and its inability to overcome the arrears.</i> Analysis: Departments should undertake regular auditing of FRAs to ensure they are correct, remain current and recommendations tracked to completion. This needs to be completed by a competent person
Local issues or gaps - Not all higher complexity departments have fire competent persons. The new Health & safety Management framework sets a minimal expectation for the levels of competency to be reflective of a departments risk / operational risk profile. An area of weakness throughout the operation is the general direction and systems to manage, coordinate and train people on this key issue. Recent Safe365 audit date shows an opportunity to improve local auditing and verification processes. This gap can potentially expose us to risks manifesting. This is a key legal requirement. In DCCS with their risk profile and the load this would place on the housing division for this is to be done they would need to procure BAFE SP205 external company to carry out the audit and provide third party assurance.

Recommendation Reference 41.1
Key Theme - Inspection and maintenance of entrance doors
Area - Monitoring
City of London Corporation Owner - DCCS, City Surveyors, Town Clerks
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i> <i>41.1 On the night of the Grenfell Tower fire many of the self-closing devices on the front doors of flats in the block failed to work effectively and some were entirely missing. As a result, many doors remained open when the occupants left, allowing smoke to enter the lobbies, which quickly became smoke logged. The absence of effective self-closing devices was therefore an important cause of the inability of many occupants to escape the tower at a time when the stairs were relatively free of smoke. It represents a serious defect in the management of the building in relation to fire safety.</i> Analysis: Departments must ensure that resident front doors are inspected annually and are suitable, including the door closing device. Records must be maintained.

Local issues or gaps - No corporate wide system to manage tracking of action completion. In DCCS housing this may need to be contracted out to a company with experience in this area, or training of current staff. The Corporation does currently have a e-training course on this topic.

Recommendation Reference 42.9/13

Key Theme - Fire safety information

Area – Resident engagement

City of London Corporation Owner – DCCS, City Surveyors, Town Clerks

Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report

42.9 The delay in the production of the resident's handbook illustrates many aspects of the TMO's attitude to its fire safety obligations. The effectiveness of the TMO's Emergency Plan depended to a great extent on residents being aware of what to do in an emergency, but the TMO's failure over such a long period of time to make it available denied residents one useful means of receiving that information. No reasonable explanation was offered for that failure.

42.13 The letter was provided to residents as part of an induction pack by Moira MacDonald, the TMO officer who arranged viewings for prospective tenants. They could ask for a translation, but there is no evidence that they were routinely told that a translation could be provided. There was no system to record whether residents received the letter during the induction process.

Analysis: All residents must be provided with suitable fire safety information, through a range of media to meet the resident's needs, with records maintained confirming the information has been provided

Local issues or gaps - No corporate wide system to manage tracking of records. Resident Engagement strategies have just commenced at the Barbican Estate. A resident engagement strategy has been established as part of the development of the building safety case. Building specific strategies will be developed to reflect the residents.

Recommendation Reference 46.10/90 & 113.79

Key Theme - Vulnerable residents

Area - Resident engagement

City of London Corporation Owner - DCCS, City Surveyors, Town Clerks

Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report

46.10 Paragraph 79.11, on the other hand, states that the case of "general needs" block it is not realistic to expect the responsible person to hold information relating to residents with mobility or other conditions affecting their ability to escape in a way that enables it to be made available to the fire and rescue services, for example, in a premises information box. The justification offered is the difficulty of keeping that information up to date and the risk that inaccurate information could be more harmful than no information. However, although we understand the risks involved, we do not think it is impracticable for the responsible person to make

available to the fire and rescue services by digital or other means reliable information about those with chronic disabilities whose ability to evacuate the building without assistance in an emergency is known to be compromised. Again, that was the subject of a recommendation in the chairman's Phase 1 report.

46.90 On any view, the Grenfell Tower fire revealed the importance of ensuring that the responsible person collects sufficient information about any vulnerable occupants to enable PEEPs to be prepared, when appropriate, and, in the event of a fire, appropriate measures to be taken to assist their escape. The TMO's failure to collect such information illustrates a basic neglect of its obligations in relation to fire safety.

113.79 We conclude our recommendations by looking back to Phase 1. In the Phase 1 report the chairman recommended that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans (PEEPs) for all residents whose ability to evacuate the building without assistance may be compromised (such as persons with reduced mobility or impaired cognition) and to include current information about them and their associated PEEPs in a premises information box.

113.82 We therefore recommend that further consideration be given to the recommendations made in the Phase 1 report in the light of our findings in this report.

- Vulnerable people should be identified and records maintained to assist the fire and rescue services if an evacuation is required.*
- If the recommended from Phase 1 for PEEPs is subsequently enacted, having the information of vulnerable people will be key.*

Analysis: Departments should identify and retain records for vulnerable people to assist the fire services. Further guidance and regulation are currently planned for introduction of Residential PEEPS by government.

Local issues or gaps - No corporate wide system is currently in place to manage this information. In DCCS once the resources are in place they would advocate the use of Person Centred Fire Risk Assessments (PCFRAs)

Recommendation Reference 113.15
Key Theme - Fire safety strategy
Area – Fire management
City of London Corporation Owner - All Departments & Institutions
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i>
<i>113.15 A fire safety strategy for a building should describe its structure and the various fire protection systems it contains and set out how they work together to ensure the safety of the occupants in the event of a fire. Those involved in the design and execution of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment failed to understand properly the need for a fire safety strategy and therefore failed to ensure that a final version of the Outline Fire Safety Strategy begun by Exova was completed.</i>

That allowed the building to be in a dangerous condition on completion. In order to avoid a repeat of that error, we consider that there is a compelling case for requiring a fire safety strategy to be produced as a condition of obtaining building control approval for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and approved on completion.

We therefore recommend that it be made a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer to be submitted with building control applications (at Gateway 2) for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion (Gateway 3). Such a strategy must take into account the needs of vulnerable people, including the additional time they may require to leave the building or reach a place of safety within it and any additional facilities necessary to ensure their safety.

Analysis: Fire safety strategies should be prepared for all relevant buildings by a competent person (registered fire engineer) during refurbishment projects. Retrospective fire strategies should be prepared for relevant properties which currently do not have one and managed throughout the premises life.

Local issues or gaps - Funding for retrospective fire strategies has not been accounted for. Issue relevant to non-residential premises as well. In DCCS fire strategies will be produced for all the relevant buildings, this work has commenced.

Recommendation Reference 113.41
Key Theme - Fire risk assessors
Area - Procurement
City of London Corporation Owner - All Departments & Institutions
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i>
<i>113.41 As we have pointed out in Chapter 12, concern has been expressed for many years about the competence of some of those offering their services as commercial fire risk assessors and the absence of any scheme of regulation to ensure that responsible persons under the Fire Safety Order can have confidence in the skill and experience of those whom they instruct to carry out fire risk assessments on their behalf.</i>
<i>We therefore recommend that the government establish a system of mandatory accreditation to certify the competence of fire risk assessors by setting standards for qualification and continuing professional development and such other measures as may be considered necessary or desirable. We think it necessary for an accreditation system to be mandatory in order to ensure the competence of all those who offer their services as fire risk assessors.</i>
Analysis: The Corporation should only use competent fire risk assessors. This can be achieved by using third party accredited fire risk assessment companies until further measures are implemented by government.

Local issues or gaps - Current corporate FRA contracts are under review/renewal. A procurement exercise is due to close shortly to ensure a competent provider is in place.

This section marks the end of the Fire Safety Management review.

5. Response Management review

Recommendation Reference 113.70
Key Theme – London Local Authority Gold (LLA Gold)
Regional Owner - Report LARRB
Regional Owner or Contributor – Standardisation Board/Training, Exercising and Lessons Board
City of London Corporation Owner – Director of Security and Counter Terrorism/Town Clerks Office/Resilience Team
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i> <i>Although each London borough is a separate Category 1 responder, there are arrangements for promoting resilience across the capital as a whole, in particular through the London Local Authority Gold arrangements. Events demonstrated, however, that there is a need for a clearer understanding of the nature of the London Gold arrangements, in particular in situations in which a single borough is affected.</i> Analysis: We therefore recommend that the guidance on the operation of those arrangements be revised and that; existing and newly appointed chief executives be given regular training to ensure they are familiar with its principles.
Local issues or gaps – None.

Recommendation Reference 113.71
Key Theme – Local Resilience Forums
Regional Owner - London Resilience Forum
Regional Owner or Contributor – GLA/LRU?
City of London Corporation Owner – Resilience Team -
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i> <i>Our investigations revealed the inability of the London Resilience Forum to monitor the quality of its members' planning, training and preparation for responding to emergencies. Neither Minimum Standards for London, which applied at the time, nor its replacement, Resilience Standards for London, gave the local resilience forum any means of securing compliance with the standards they prescribed. We note that in the Resilience Framework the government has recognised the need to strengthen local resilience forums.</i>

Analysis: We therefore recommend that local resilience forums adopt national standards to ensure effective training, preparation and planning for emergencies and adopt independent auditing schemes to identify deficiencies and secure compliance. We also recommend that a mechanism be introduced for independently verifying the frequency and quality of training provided by local authorities and other Category 1 responders

Local issues or gaps – None.

Recommendation Reference – 113.72

Key Theme – HALO

Regional Owner - Report LARRB

Regional Owner or Contributor – Humanitarian Assistance Programme Board

City of London Corporation Owner – DCCS/Resilience Team

Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report

The failure of The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) to meet the basic needs of those displaced in the days immediately following the fire demonstrated the need for local authorities to have effective plans in place for providing humanitarian assistance.

Analysis: It also emphasised the need for those plans to be supported by a qualified humanitarian assistance liaison (Should read LEAD) officer (HALO) and for there to be regular practice in putting them into effect. There is scope for all those required to respond to emergencies to learn from each other's experience and promote best practice

Local issues or gaps – DCCS Emergency Plan review and HALO Exercise
Full training record of HALO trained Directors recorded

Recommendation Reference – 113.73

Key Theme – Resilience is Everyone's Business

Regional Owner - Report LARRB

Regional Owner or Contributor – Heads of HR Network

City of London Corporation Owner – HR /SLT/ DCCS Director

Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report

RBKC was not able to provide an effective response to the emergency because it had not made adequate arrangements for staffing the emergency communication centre, had not made adequate provision for humanitarian assistance, including the provision of accommodation and financial support, did not have the ability to keep accurate records of those who needed help and had no effective system for communicating with the public. All those shortcomings could and should be avoided in future by a combination of measures but underpinning them all is a need for the staff of local authorities to treat resilience and preparedness for emergencies as an essential part of their responsibilities.

Analysis: We therefore recommend that local authorities train all their employees, including chief executives, to regard resilience as an integral part of their responsibilities.

Local issues or gaps – Await Regional steer.

Recommendation Reference – 113.74
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Key Theme – Electronic recording response and recovery
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Regional Owner - Report LARRB

Regional Owner or Contributor – HA Program Board/Standardisation Board
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City of London Corporation Owner – Resilience Team/DCCS

<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i>
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RBKC had no effective means of collecting and recording information about those who had been displaced from the tower and surrounding buildings, including those who were missing. Compiling reliable information of that kind is difficult and the challenges likely to be faced by local authority Category 1 responders will vary according to the nature of the emergency.

Analysis: We recommend that all local authorities devise methods of obtaining and recording information of that kind, if possible, in electronic form, and practise putting them into operation under a variety of different circumstances.

Local issues or gaps - Await Regional steer
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DCCS Emergency Plan to include method of obtaining and recording information
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Recommendation Reference – 113.75
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Key Theme – Temporary Accommodation

Regional Owner - Report LARRB

Regional Owner or Contributor – Directors of Housing Network
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City of London Corporation Owner – DCCS/Resilience Team

<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i>
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Any local authority is likely to have difficulty finding temporary accommodation for a very large number of displaced persons but the need to do so should be recognised and contingency plans drawn up.

Analysis: We recommend that all local authorities make such arrangements as are reasonably practicable for enabling them to place people in temporary accommodation at short notice and in ways that meet their personal, religious and cultural requirements. Such arrangements should, as far as possible, involve local providers of social housing

Local issues or gaps - Await Regional steer
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No DCCS staff on call. Are our Housing Directors represented at the Directors of Housing Network meetings? Stronger relationships with Faith and Voluntary sector via our BRF.
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Recommendation Reference – 113.76
Key Theme – Financial Support
Regional Owner - Report LARRB
Regional Owner or Contributor – Society of London Treasurers
City of London Corporation Owner – Chamberlains
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i>
<i>Effective humanitarian assistance is vital in ensuring that those who are most affected by an emergency are treated with dignity and respect and do not suffer additional trauma as a result of an inability to take control of their situation. In the case of the response to the Grenfell Tower fire three matters caused particular resentment: the circumstances surrounding some of the temporary accommodation, the difficulty in obtaining financial support in the days immediately following the fire and breakdowns in the support provided by key workers. Problems arising from the provision of suitable temporary accommodation may be difficult to resolve but other complaints should be easier to avoid by careful planning.</i>
Analysis: We recommend that all local authorities include in their contingency plans arrangements for providing immediate financial assistance to people affected by an emergency.
Local issues or gaps – Await regional steer. Chamberlains staff not on call

Recommendation Reference – 113.76
Key Theme – Critical Key Worker Role
Regional Owner - Report LARRB
Regional Owner or Contributor – HA Programme Board
City of London Corporation Owner – HR/DCCS
We recommend that as part of their planning for emergencies local authorities give detailed consideration to the availability of key workers and the role they are expected to play so that suitable contingency arrangements can be made to ensure, as far as possible, continuity of support
Local issues or gaps – Await Regional steer. Do key workers have to be Social Workers? Would we have enough to fulfil this role and conduct BAU? No DCCS staff on call. Key Worker role and activation to be added to Corporate and DCCS Emergency Plan

Recommendation Reference – 113.77
Key Theme – Communication
Regional Owner - Report LARRB
Regional Owner or Contributor - London Heads of Communications Network
City of London Corporation Owner – Communications and External Affairs
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i> <i>One important aspect of humanitarian assistance that was absent following the Grenfell Tower fire was regular communication between those providing assistance and those in need of it. For example, too many people who had been found temporary accommodation felt that they had then been left on their own, not knowing for how long they were expected to remain or on what terms and without anyone to turn to, to provide that information. That gave rise to a sense of isolation and powerlessness.</i> Analysis: We recommend that as part of their emergency planning local authorities make effective arrangements for continuing communication with those who need assistance using the most suitable technology and a range of languages appropriate to the area
Local issues or gaps - Await Regional steer

Recommendation Reference – 113.78
Key Theme – Communication
Regional Owner - Report LARRB
Regional Owner or Contributor - London Heads of Communications Network
City of London Corporation Owner – Communications and External Affairs/SLT Golds
<i>Recommendation and Paragraph in Grenfell report</i> <i>It is also important not to lose sight of those who, although not physically affected by an emergency, may be worried about the safety of friends or relations caught up in it. Again, effective communication is essential.</i> Analysis: We recommend that all local authorities include in their plans for responding to emergencies arrangements for providing information to the public by whatever combination of modern methods of communication are likely to be most effective for the areas for which they are responsible. In future, to avoid confusion, wasted effort and frustration we also recommend that what in the past has been called by the police a “casualty bureau” be described in a way that makes it clear that it does not provide information to the public about people affected by the emergency
Local issues or gaps – Await Regional steer

Corporate & Strategic Implications

Strategic implications – Health and safety, including fire safety, are part of our People Strategy and responsibilities embedded into our Corporate Health & Safety Policy, but they are not consistently applied by all leaders. The Safe365 system and our health and safety framework aim to integrate these responsibilities into leadership culture. Without full alignment, we risk emerging safety issues, which could impact our ability to deliver the Corporate Plan and People Strategy.

Financial implications – It is not yet possible to quantify fully what additional resources (financial or otherwise) may be required in respect of addressing the recommendations of this report. Updates to IT systems and external support will be required where work exceeds current staff capacity. Non-compliant buildings may face higher insurance costs, funding issues, and reduced property value, making them harder to sell or lease.

Resource implications – As above.

Legal implications – As per the report there is some exposure for the City Corporation with not meeting requirements under the Building Safety Act and associated legislation. We are vulnerable, should a serious incident arise. The costs and reputational impact of such prosecutions can be considerable. Personal prosecutions, though unlikely, can result in custodial sentences. Regulatory breaches could erode stakeholder confidence, affecting future investment and service user trust.

Risk implications – reputational damage to the City of London Corporation.

Equalities implications – Non-compliance disproportionately affects vulnerable groups, including, disabled residents and older people who are more vulnerable to fire hazards and structural failures. Poor building safety is more common in low-income and social housing communities, worsening housing inequalities. If buildings become unsafe or uninhabitable, tenants may be forcibly relocated, with negative impacts on minority groups, families, and disabled individuals. Discrimination claims could arise under the Equality Act 2010 if reasonable adjustments are not made.

Climate implications – none.

Security implications – none.

Conclusion

Considering the extensive recommendations outlined in this report, addressing the gaps and enhancing our fire risk assessment protocols is imperative for ensuring the safety and well-being of our communities. The establishment of a mandatory accreditation system for fire risk assessors, coupled with robust local resilience planning and comprehensive training for all staff, will significantly fortify our preparedness for potential emergencies. Whilst some of this is already underway, such as MAGIC (Multi Agency Gold Incident Command) training for all Chief Officers and the Safety for Senior Executives training programme, it is critical operational leaders' capability and knowledge is also enhanced and processes aligned to operations.

As we move forward, it is essential that we integrate these recommendations into our strategic planning and operational frameworks. By doing so, we will not only meet regulatory requirements but also uphold our commitment to creating a safe, resilient, and inclusive environment for all our stakeholders.

The organisation should take further steps to assure itself that it has full understanding of its 24/7 response capability to emergencies and major incidents. This must include the potential for a wider pool of on call officers, particularly from key responding departments. For example, DCCS, Environment (City Operations and Port Health and Public Protection) to include specific command roles at the silver tactical level in major incident response and at the operational level, of Local Authority Liaison Officers (LALO).

Financial and resource implications must be carefully considered and managed to support the implementation of these measures. Additionally, fostering strong communication channels and maintaining transparency with our communities will be key to building trust and ensuring effective emergency response.

Ultimately, the adoption of these recommendations will enhance our organisational resilience and contribute to the overall safety and security of our city. We must remain vigilant and proactive in our efforts to safeguard our future and protect the lives and properties of those we serve.

Appendices

- None

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